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decay rates of pollutant stocks in respective countries, as well as on the values of
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1 Introduction
The large literature on the gains-from-trade proposition initiated by Samuelson (1939)
generally asserts that free trade is bene¯cial to all the participating nations. Moreover, the
so-called `new trade theory' which incorporates imperfect competition and/or increasing
returns has found new sources of gains from trade. Among others, Markusen (1981)
makes it clear that the opening of trade promotes competition, from which all trading
countries can gain.
To the best of our knowledge, however, the existing literature on gains from trade
under imperfect competition has not fully investigated into cross-border and long-term
environmental issues associated with increased economic activities,1 whereas in reality the
concerns over `transboundary stock pollution' problems, such as global warming, strato-
spheric ozone-layer depletion and acid rain, seem to play increasingly important parts in
recent negotiations over more liberalized trade regimes at both global and regional scales.
Such a trend is exempli¯ed in the debates over NAFTA where freer commercial interac-
tions in North America were frequently opposed partly on the ground of environmental
protection. Similar arguments have also been repeatedly made by citizen groups who
persistently resist so-called globalization, as was symbolically manifested in their fever-
ish oppositions towards the World Trade Organization (WTO) Round Talk in Seattle in
1999.2
This paper aims to explore how the possible existence of gains from international trade
in a polluting product can be a®ected by di®erent modes of international duopolistic com-
petition, namely, Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash types of competition. In addition, more
signi¯cantly, we show that, when the pollution issue is transboundary and persistent
by nature, the existence of gains from trade liberalization depends upon the following
two physical characteristics of the pollution problem, the magnitudes of international
1There exist game-theoretic studies which investigate into the welfare implications of transboundary
stock pollution problems. Important examples of such studies are Long (1992) and Dockner and Long
(1993) for global pollution issues and Kaitala, Pohjola and Tahvonen (1992) and MÄaler and de Zeeuw
(1998) for regional transboundary pollution issues. However, these studies do not account for the e®ects
of international trade.
2Discussing various alleged rationals for the resistance to globalization, Bhagwati (2004) critically
evaluates each one of them from a viewpoint of the international trade theory.
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transportation coe±cients of pollutant emissions and decay rates of pollutant stocks in
respective countries, as well as on the values of other environmental and economic vari-
ables, such as discount rates and marginal damage costs of pollution.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model of an economy
with transboundary stock pollution and derives its autarkic outcome. By extending the
model to a two-country world, the next section characterizes the free trade outcomes in
two di®erent modes of international competition. Then, Section 4 compares these results
and discusses how the welfare implications of trade liberalization can be in°uenced by
the environmental characteristics surrounding the pollution problem. The last section
contains brief concluding remarks.
2 Autarky
This section develops our basic model and describes its autarkic outcome. The model
is comprised of two countries (Home and Foreign), two goods (Goods 1 and 2), and one
primary factor (labor). We assume that both countries share the identical preferences
and production technologies, and produce both goods. In the following description of our
model, we focus on the Home country since the Foreign country can be described sym-
metrically. We denote each Foreign variable by attaching an asterisk (*). Furthermore,
Good 2 serves as a numeraire and is produced with a unitary input coe±cient so that the
wage rate is internationally equalized and ¯xed at unity. In the autarkic case, Good 1 is
monopolistically supplied by a single domestic ¯rm and c > 0 units of labor are required
to produce one unit of Good 1. Hence, the marginal cost of its production is assumed
to be constant at c. In addition, we suppose that the production of one unit of Good 1
entails one unit of pollutant emissions.
Now, let us assume that the utility function of a representative consumer in Home
can be speci¯ed by3
V =
Z 1
0
e¡rt
·
AC1 ¡ C
2
1
2
+ C2 ¡ sZ
¸
dt; A > c; r; s > 0; (1)
where V is the consumer's utility level, r is the discount rate, Ci; i = 1; 2, is the consump-
3For simplicity, we suppose that the population of consumers in each country is normalized to one.
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tion of each good, s is the constant marginal damage cost of the pollutant stock, and Z is
the pollutant stock level in this country. We assume, furthermore, that the generation of
the pollutant emissions associated with the consumption of Good 1 is treated as a nega-
tive externality by this consumer and, therefore, out of its control. Hence, the consumer
maximizes its utility by ignoring the adverse e®ects of the stock pollution completely.
This is essentially the same as the case where the consumer maximizes its instantaneous
utility without considering the environmental damage cost.
Letting p denotes the price of Good 1 measured by the price of Good 2, this consumer's
utility maximization problem subject to the budget constraint yields the demand function
of Good 1:
C1 = A¡ p:
Under autarky, the market-clearing condition is
A¡ p = x;
where x is the output of Good 1. Hence, the inverse demand function and the monopoly
¯rm's pro¯t at each time instant are respectively de¯ned by
p = A¡ x; (2)
¼ ´ (A¡ c¡ x)x: (3)
Using (2) and (3), the long-term social welfare of the nation, U , which is the sum of
the consumer surplus, the monopolist's pro¯t, and the environmental damage cost of the
pollution over the in¯nite time horizon, can be expressed as
U =
Z 1
0
e¡rt
·
(A¡ p)2
2
+ ¼ ¡ sZ
¸
dt: (4)
In the subsequent analysis, (4) determines the intertemporal social welfare of the country
in each situation.
As for the transboundary e®ects of the pollutant emissions, we assume that one unit
of Foreign's (resp. Home's) pollutant emissions x¤ (resp. x) increases Home's (resp. For-
eign's) current pollutant °ow level by the fraction of ® 2 [0; 1] (resp. ®¤) while one unit
of domestic emissions increases its own pollutant °ow by one unit. In the literature of
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environmental economics, ® and ®¤ are sometimes referred to as `transportation coe±-
cients', but we call them `pollutant import coe±cients' here in order to emphasize the
directions of the pollutant °ow. In the case of a global pollutant, such as CO2 that is
a culprit of the global warming problem, we have ® = ®¤ = 1, while at least one of ®
and ®¤ is strictly smaller than one and they normally take di®erent values in so-called
regional environmental issues, such as the transboundary acid rain problem in Northern
Europe and East Asia. When ® = ®¤ = 0, on the other hand, the pollution problem is
completely localized. In sum, the pollution levels in the respective countries are described
as
_Z = x+ ®x¤ ¡ kZ; (5)
_Z¤ = x¤ + ®¤x¡ k¤Z¤; (6)
where _Z and _Z¤ respectively denote the time derivatives of the pollutant stocks, and
k and k¤ are so-called decay rates of the pollutant stocks in the respective countries.
Thus, we suppose that the pollutant stocks in these countries are subject to the pattern
of an exponential decay as in Kaitala et al. (1992) and Dockner and Long (1993). We
also assume in this article that, while the preference-related variables of the consumers,
such as discount rates and marginal costs of the pollution, and ¯rms' production costs
are exactly symmetric across the two countries, the environmental variables, such as
pollutant import coe±cients and decay rate of the pollutants can be diverse, and mainly
focus on the impacts of the latter variables on the long-term social welfare.
Let us now formulate the pro¯t maximization problem of each country's ¯rm. For
the simplicity of expositions, we write the behaviors of the ¯rms in both countries in a
completely static fashion although the ¯rms' actual behaviors would not change at all
if they maximized their respective long-term pro¯ts intertemporally since the ¯rms do
not care about the stock pollution issue, quite similarly to a consumer who disregards
the pollution problem as an externality. Again, we focus on the Home ¯rm since its
Foreign counterpart acts in exactly the same fashion. Speci¯cally, the Home ¯rm solves
the following problem in the autarkic case:
max
x
(A¡ c¡ x)x;
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whose solution can be immediately obtained as
xA =
A¡ c
2
; (7)
where the superscript A represents the autarkic outcome. Also, the autarkic price is
derived from the demand function as
pA =
A+ c
2
: (8)
Under autarky, hence, the ¯rm essentially acts as a monopolist in each domestic market
of the polluting product.
Substituting (7) into (5), we have4
_ZA = (1 + ®)
A¡ c
2
¡ kZA;
where ZA is the pollutant stock in Home under autarky. This is a simple ¯rst-order linear
ordinary di®erential equation, which can be easily solved and yields the following path
of the pollutant stock over time in Home:
ZA = e¡ktZ0 + (1¡ e¡kt)(1 + ®)(A¡ c)
2k
; (9)
where Z0 is the initial pollutant stock level in the Home country.
Now, we are ready to compute the intertemporal social welfare of this nation. Through-
out this paper, let us express the value of social welfare of each country by excluding the
in°uence of the initial pollutant stock level. This is acceptable for our main purpose
here, i.e., to analyze the welfare implications of trade liberalization by comparing the rel-
ative payo®s of an individual nation under the respective situations, mainly because the
marginal damage cost of the pollution is assumed constant. If the damage cost function
were nonlinear, the initial pollutant stock level would certainly matter.
By substituting the time-path of the pollutant stock in (9) except the term involving
Z0, as well as (3) and (8) into (4), the intertemporal social welfare of the Home country
4Note that the ¯rm in Foreign produces the same amount of Good 1 as Home's ¯rm in the autarkic case
by our symmetry assumptions on the characteristics of the ¯rms as well as the representative consumers
across the countries.
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in the autarkic outcome can be written as
UA =
3
8
(A¡ c)2
Z 1
0
e¡rtdt¡ s(1 + ®)(A¡ c)
2k
Z 1
0
e¡rt
£
1¡ e¡kt¤ dt
=
3
8r
(A¡ c)2 ¡ s(1 + ®)
2r(r + k)
(A¡ c): (10)
It should be noted that, even under autarky, the welfare of Home is a®ected by the
production level in Foreign through the transboundary pollution °ow in (5). Hence,
there exists a negative externality associated with the production of Good 1 across the
two countries. The next section extends this model to an international duopoly in two
di®erent modes of competition.
3 International duopoly
When the two domestic markets of Good 1 described above is fully integrated interna-
tionally, the new market-clearing condition becomes
C1 + C
¤
1 = 2(A¡ p) = x+ x¤;
which is inverted to yield
p = A¡ x+ x
¤
2
: (11)
This de¯nes the inverse demand function for Good 1 in the international market and each
¯rm's pro¯t function becomes
¼ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x:
First, we consider the case where the two ¯rms are engaged in a Cournot-Nash competi-
tion in this aggregated market. In essence, these ¯rms determine their respective output
supply levels concurrently. Speci¯cally, these two ¯rms respectively attempt to solve the
following maximization problems:
max
x
¼ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x;
max
x¤
¼¤ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x¤:
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We can immediately obtain the ¯rst-order conditions:
A¡ c¡ x
¤
2
¡ x = 0;
A¡ c¡ x
2
¡ x¤ = 0;
which lead to their respective reaction functions:
x = A¡ c¡ x
¤
2
; (12)
x¤ = A¡ c¡ x
2
: (13)
Solving these equations simultaneously, we can obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
levels of output supply for the respective ¯rms:
xC = x¤C =
2(A¡ c)
3
: (14)
Furthermore, the equilibrium price becomes
pC =
A+ 2c
3
: (15)
Comparing (8) and (15), we can easily con¯rm pC < pA, which implies that the pro-
competitive e®ect of the opening of international trade emerges under the Cournot-Nash
competition.
Moreover, the long-term social welfare of the Home country can be obtained in the
exact same way as in the autarkic case above. Consequently, we have the Home country's
intertemporal social welfare except the e®ect of the initial pollutant stock level as
UC =
4
9r
(A¡ c)2 ¡ 2s(1 + ®)
3r(r + k)
(A¡ c): (16)
As another possible mode of international duopoly under free trade, we also consider
the case where the two ¯rms are engaged in a Stackelberg type competition. In a Stack-
elberg duopoly, the leader ¯rm is somehow able to make a credible commitment with
respect to the supply level of Good 1 prior to its follower. In order to simplify the de-
scriptions, as a possible form of Stackelberg-type competition, we focus on the case where
Home's ¯rm is the Stackelberg leader and Foreign's ¯rm is the follower in this possible
international Stackelberg market. It should be noted that exactly the same argument
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holds even when the roles in a Stackelberg equilibrium are reversed between the two
¯rms.
Substituting the reaction function of the Foreign's ¯rm, (13), into the de¯nition of ¼
above, the Home ¯rm's pro¯t function, when it acts as the Stackelberg leader, can be
described as
¼ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x
=
µ
A¡ c
2
¡ x
4
¶
x:
Thus, from the pro¯t maximization problem of this Stackelberg leader, we can easily
derive the following levels of output supply in the Stackelberg equilibrium:
xL = A¡ c; (17)
xF =
A¡ c
2
; (18)
where xL and xF respectively denote the output levels of the leader and the follower.
Furthermore, the equilibrium price, pS, becomes
pS = A¡ x
L + xF
2
=
A+ 3c
4
: (19)
Comparing (15) and (19), we can observe pS < pC , i.e., the price of Good 1 is even lower
under the Stackelberg competition than under the Cournot-Nash competition. Hence,
the procompetitive e®ect of international trade is strengthened further in the Stackelberg
outcome.
In a similar way to the autarkic case above, substituting (17) and (18) into (5) and
(6), we can obtain the path of the respective nations' pollutant stocks over time. Then,
by substituting this time-path of the pollutant stock as well as (3) and (19) into (4), we
have the levels of the intertemporal social welfare of the countries with the leader ¯rm
and the follower ¯rm, respectively, as
UL =
17
32r
(A¡ c)2 ¡ s(2 + ®)
2r(r + k)
(A¡ c); (20)
U¤F =
13
32r
(A¡ c)2 ¡ s(1 + 2®
¤)
2r(r + k¤)
(A¡ c): (21)
Once again, these values of intertemporal social welfare are described by excluding the
e®ects of the initial pollutant stocks just for the simplicity of exposition.
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4 Gains from trade
In this section, we examine how the possible existence of gains from international trade
in a polluting product can be a®ected not only by the mode of international duopolistic
competition but also by the magnitudes of certain environmental variables. Especially, we
focus upon the two physical characteristics of the environment, i.e., k, the decay rate of
the pollutant stock, and ®, the transboundary pollutant import coe±cient, and suppose
that the two countries are completely symmetric in all the economic aspects as well as in
the other environmental aspects than expressed by these variables.
Our ¯rst main result is concerned with the welfare aspect of trade liberalization under
the Cournot-Nash type competition.
Proposition 1. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome under free trade brings net gain
from trade to each country if and only if
k + r >
12s(1 + ®)
5(A¡ c) ; (22)
k¤ + r >
12s(1 + ®¤)
5(A¡ c) : (23)
Proof. Given UC in (16) and UA in (10), we can easily verify that the inequality UC > UA
is equivalent to (22) after some calculations. An exactly parallel argument to Foreign
yields (23). Q.E.D.
Graphically, the condition (22) implies that, if the actual values of the relevant vari-
ables fall in the shaded region C in Figure 1 with ® on the horizontal axis and (k+ r) on
the vertical axis,5 the Cournot-Nash competition in the international market can bring
net gain from trade to the Home country.
(Figure 1 around here)
Thus, given a particular value of the pollutant import coe±cient, ®, as well as the
values of other variables such as the discount rate and the marginal cost of the pollution,
5Since k and r virtually play the same roles in our results, we mainly express them in such a combi-
nation.
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the decay rate of the pollutant stock, k, needs to take a su±ciently high value in order for
the country to gain from international trade with the Cournot-Nash competition. On the
other hand, if the pollutant possesses such a prolonged adverse e®ect in a country that,
at least, one of (22) and (23) is violated and, therefore, the values of the variables fall
within the unshaded region A in Figure 1, the government of this country would, quite
legitimately, attempt to disallow the international trade in the Cournot-Nash fashion and
the trade in this polluting product might not materialize between the countries. In other
words, if a country is su±ciently vulnerable to the pollution issue, in terms of a slow
decay process of the pollutant stock, it rationally opts for remaining in autarky for the
fear of the long-term e®ect of the pollution, even though free trade in the good itself
could be mutually gainful. We can also understand that the environmental proximity,
in the sense of a higher value of the pollutant import coe±cient, requires the country's
environment to assimilate the pollutant more quickly, i.e., to have a higher value of the
pollutant decay rate, in order for this country to be able to gain from trade liberalization.
However, the Cournot-Nash type competition is not the only possible mode of an
international duopoly market. In fact, even though either one of the conditions, (22) and
(23), is violated, a Stackelberg-type competition might be able to provide an additional
opportunity for both countries to bene¯t from the international trade in this polluting
good. As for the Stackelberg equilibrium outcome under free trade, we have the following
two results concerning the e®ect of the opening of trade on each country's intertemporal
social welfare:
Proposition 2. The Stackelberg equilibrium outcome under free trade brings net gain
from trade to Home, whose ¯rm is the leader, if and only if
k + r >
16s
5(A¡ c) : (24)
Proof. Given UL in (20) and UA in (10), the inequality UL > UA immediately leads to
(24). Q.E.D.
Proposition 3. The Stackelberg equilibrium outcome under free trade brings net gain
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from trade to Foreign, whose ¯rm is the follower, if and only if
k¤ + r >
16s®¤
A¡ c : (25)
Proof. Given U¤F in (21) and U¤A given in (10), we can easily show that the inequality
U¤F > U¤A is equivalent to (25). Q.E.D.
These last two propositions can be expressed graphically in Figure 2.
(Figure 2 around here)
In the upper diagram of Figure 2, if the actual values of the variables fall in the shaded
region S, the Stackelberg type competition in the international market can bring net gain
from trade to the Home country whose ¯rm assumes the role of the Stackelberg leader in
the international duopoly. In the lower diagram, on the other hand, the shaded region S¤
corresponds to the values of the variables where the Foreign country can bene¯t from the
trade in the polluting product when its ¯rm acts as the Stackelberg follower. Interestingly,
the value of ® does not play any role in the condition (24) and, as a consequence, the
region S is demarcated by a horizontal straight line. This is due to the speci¯c structure
of our model which leads to xF = xA, namely, the amount of good 1 produced by the
Foreign ¯rm does not change at all by moving from autarky to the international duopoly
in the Stackelberg fashion. In other words, Home is a®ected to an exactly identical extent
by the Foreign ¯rm's pollutant emissions both in the autarkic case and in the Stackelberg
outcome.
As in the case of the Cournot-Nash type competition, the Stackelberg outcome is
bene¯cial to Foreign as well as Home if its decay rate of the pollutant stock takes a
su±ciently high value. For Foreign, if its environment does not get a®ected signi¯cantly
by the transboundary °ow of the pollutant, or put di®erently, if the value of ®¤ is quite
small, it might be still better o® by having its ¯rm in the international Stackelberg market
than by remaining in autarky even though the pollutant has a very persistent adverse
impact, i.e., the value of k¤ is extremely small. This is because, when ®¤ is very small, the
country with the follower ¯rm does not have to su®er too signi¯cantly from the emission
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expansion in the other country under international trade while it can bene¯t from the
procompetitive e®ect.
Concerning this Stackelberg outcome, we can further observe that:
Proposition 4. Suppose that the two countries possess exactly the same values of ®
and k. Then, if the following inequality is satis¯ed, the Home country whose ¯rm is
the ¯rst-mover in the international Stackelberg duopoly bene¯ts relatively more than the
Foreign country whose ¯rm is the second mover, and, otherwise, the country with the
second mover has a relative advantage:
k + r >
4s(1¡ ®)
A¡ c : (26)
Proof. We have the case where the country with the ¯rst mover bene¯ts relatively more
from international trade in the Stackelberg fashion if UL > U¤F , given UL in (20) and
U¤F in (21) with ® = ®¤ and k = k¤. We can easily con¯rm that this condition can be
transformed into (26). Q.E.D.
In the context of our model, therefore, there exists cases where a country would prefer
to have its own ¯rm become the Stackelberg follower in the international duopoly rather
than the Stackelberg leader. Such a situation occurs when k+ r < 4s(1¡®)
A¡c holds, namely,
when the pollutant decay rate is su±ciently small or the pollutant import coe±cient is
su±ciently large. Combined with the condition in Proposition 3, where the Stackelberg-
type competition under free trade brings net gains to the country with the follower ¯rm,
16s®
A¡c < k + r <
4s(1¡®)
A¡c is needed for this country to bene¯ts from the trade and, at
the same time, to be better o® than the country with the leader ¯rm. Hence, from the
restriction that there is a non-empty interval of k+ r that satis¯es the last condition, we
can see that such a case is possible only when ® < 1
3
, i.e., the pollution issue must be
su±ciently localized.
The four propositions above have interesting implications for the welfare impacts of
trade liberalization. For the simplicity of expositions, we focus on the two limiting cases
in the following discussion. First, let us set ® = ®¤ = 0 under which pollution is fully
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localized within each country. Then, (22) reduces to
k + r >
12s
5(A¡ c) : (27)
Therefore, in order for a country to gain from trade in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in
the presence of a completely localized pollution problem, the pollutant decay rate must be
su±ciently large so that the procompetitive e®ect outweighs the losses from the adverse
impact of domestic pollution expansion under free trade.
Concerning the gains/losses from trade in the Stackelberg case, (25) is trivially satis-
¯ed since the right-hand side diminishes to zero in a completely localized pollution issue,
which, in turn, implies that Foreign necessarily gains from trade under the Stackelberg
type competition. In contrast, whether Home gains from trade in the Stackelberg equi-
librium is contingent on the scale of the pollutant decay rate as is expressed in (24).
These observations stems from a special feature of a Stackelberg-type competition, i.e.,
the Home ¯rm produces more than the Foreign ¯rm as can be easily observed in (17)
and (18). Moreover, in our speci¯c model we have xF = xA, namely, the Foreign output
amount does not change at all by moving from autarky to free trade in the Stackelberg
fashion. Hence, the Foreign's pollutant emission level remains the same under these two
regimes. Therefore, Foreign can enjoy only the procompetitive gains from trade under
the Stackelberg-type competition.6
In contrast, Home may lose from trade due to the overwhelming pollution expansion
e®ect by moving from autarky to having its ¯rm become the Stackelberg leader. Indeed,
if the marginal damage cost is large enough, or the pollutant decay rate is small enough,
to violate the condition (24), the pollution expansion e®ect plays a dominant role and
more than o®sets the procompetitive gain of international trade. As a result, Home can
possibly lose from trade under the Stackelberg competition while Foreign can bene¯t from
it.
According to Proposition 4, moreover, the Foreign country with its ¯rm acting as the
Stackelberg follower in the international market is relatively better o® than the Home
6In fact, the Foreign ¯rm's pro¯t necessarily declines as the price of the good gets lower with trade
liberalization in the Stackelberg manner. However, this loss is overwhelmed by the increase in the
consumer surplus.
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country with the leader ¯rm if
k + r; k¤ + r <
4s
A¡ c: (28)
Therefore, whereas both Home and Foreign bene¯t from trade in the Stackelberg outcome
if (24) and (28) simultaneously hold, it is the Foreign country with the follower ¯rm that
bene¯ts relatively more from international trade.
Other interesting insights can be obtained for the other limiting case of ® = ®¤ = 1,
i.e., the case of global pollution. In this case, free trade with the Cournot-Nash type
competition concurrently bene¯ts both countries if and only if
k + r; k¤ + r >
24s
5(A¡ c) : (29)
While we can interpret (29) in an analogous manner to that of (27), it should be noted that
the condition (29) is more restrictive than (27). This is because the procompetitive e®ect
is more likely to dominate the losses from pollution expansion under localized pollution
than under transboundary pollution. Accordingly, the pollutant decay rate must be much
larger in a global pollution issue than in a completely localized pollution issue for both
countries to gain from international trade in the Cournot-Nash fashion.
On the other hand, the conditions of the Stackelberg outcome's bene¯ting both nations
in the presence of a global pollution problem can be obtained as follows. The Home
country gains from trade if and only if (24) holds as is also the case for any other values
of ®, while the Foreign counterpart is
k¤ + r >
16s
A¡ c: (30)
From (24) and (30), we can conclude that, for the symmetric case where k = k¤, (i) both
countries gain from trade in the Stackelberg manner if k > 16s
A¡c ¡ r, (ii) Home gains and
Foreign loses if 16s
5(A¡c) ¡ r < k < 16sA¡c ¡ r, and (iii) both lose from trade if k < 16s5(A¡c) ¡ r.
That is, whether trade liberalization with global stock pollution is gainful for each country,
as well as for the whole world, highly depends on the magnitude of the pollutant decay
rate. When the pollutant decay rate is so large that k + r > 16s
A¡c holds, free trade in
the Stackelberg fashion bene¯ts both countries. This is because the procompetitive gains
dominate the pollution expansion losses when the pollutant stock depreciates su±ciently
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fast. The opposite holds when k is su±ciently small to satisfy k + r < 16s
5(A¡c) . As a
matter of fact, qualitatively similar results always emerge, irrespective of the value of the
pollutant import coe±cient.
In the case of global pollution, furthermore, only Home gains from trade and Foreign
loses if k is insu±ciently large and belongs to the open interval, ( 16s
5(A¡c) ¡ r; 16sA¡c ¡ r).
In fact, as opposed to the case of a completely localized pollution problem, the Home
country is always relatively better o® by moving from autarky to the Stackelberg out-
come than the Foreign country in the case of a global pollution problem, as the right
hand side of the condition (26) collapses to zero and, therefore, for any value of k, Home
with its ¯rm being the Stackelberg leader in the international market bene¯ts relatively
more from trade liberalization. In other words, in a global pollution issue, Home enjoys
larger procompetitive gains which originates from its ¯rm's taking the leadership in the
international Stackelberg duopoly, while Foreign loses by the overwhelming pollution ex-
pansion e®ect which originates solely from the other country. As a result, the Stackelberg
competition under free trade can results in such a biased distribution of trade gains in the
presence of a global pollution problem, such as the global warming and the stratospheric
ozone depletion.
5 Concluding remarks
Our analytical ¯ndings might provide some new insights into practical policymaking issues
surrounding trade liberalization when a transboundary stock pollution problem is one of
each government's important concerns. Trade liberalization in a good whose production
generates transboundary pollutant emissions has two opposing e®ects: procompetitive
e®ect and pollution-expansion e®ect. The welfare implications of these e®ects of inter-
national trade are contingent on certain environmental characteristics of the pollution
problem, among other things.
In particular, the results of our analysis indicate that decay rates of pollutant stocks
and transportation coe±cients of transboundary pollution might play signi¯cant roles in
determining the existence of net gains from trade, along with the type of competition in
the potential international market of such an product. Although the country tends to
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lose from the international trade when the stock pollution in°icts larger damages upon
its environment, smaller pollutant import coe±cients and larger pollutant decay rates
might nevertheless create an opportunity to bring net gain from trade to the country.
Hence, the government needs to pay due attention to these environmental characteristics
concerning transboundary stock pollution issues in identifying the country's potential
gain from trade liberalization.
Admittedly, our model is very simple and there would still be many possible directions
of extension. For instance, we have not allowed for the role of government intervention.
It might be fruitful to examine what kinds of welfare consequences emerge if not only
the duopolistic ¯rms but also each country's government acts strategically in choosing its
environmental policy as in Barrett (1994) and Ulph (1996).
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